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COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by its attorney, Tony C. Baird, Deputy Cache County 
Attorney, and tenders its Brief in this appeal pursuant to Rule 24 U.R.A.P. as follows: 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-
3(2)(d) and (f), (1953 as amended). Pursuant to Rule 4 U.R.A.P. the Court has transferred 
this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
First Issue: Whether Trooper Kendrick had reasonable suspicion to detain the 
Defendant. 
Second Issue: Whether Trooper Kendrick lawfully opened the Defendant's car door 
to make contact with the Defendant. 
Third Issue: Whether the Defendant was properly arrested by Trooper Kendrick. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling on a motion 
to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard; State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996); and reviews the trial court's conclusions based on the totality of those facts 
for correctness. Id 
A trial court's findings of fact in a criminal bench trial are reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard. See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 n.2 (Utah 1988). A trial 
court's finding is clearly erroneous when it is against the clear weight of the evidence or, 
1 
although there is evidence to support it, the court reviewing all the record evidence is left 
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935, 939 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 
1993). The appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to 
the trial court's determination of law. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. 
GOVERNING STATUTES 
A copy of the following statute cited herein is included in the Addendum to this 
Brief: 
Utah Code Annotated. §41-6-44, (1953 as amended) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. While parked on the shoulder of the highway during the course of a traffic stop, 
Trooper Kendrick of the Utah Highway Patrol was approached by a concerned 
citizen. (R. at 13). The citizen pulled up behind the trooper's patrol car in a blue 
Dodge Caravan. He got out of his car, walked up to the Trooper and reported that he 
had just observed another car driving all over the roadway, and that this car had 
(either) struck (or) almost struck three vehicles. (R. at 32-33). The citizen identified 
the car's license plate number, make, color and direction of travel. (R. at 32). 
2 With this information, Trooper Kendrick ran the license plate number with dispatch 
and obtained the registered address. (R. at 24, 35). He proceeded to this address and 
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while nearing the location observed the suspect vehicle, a pickup truck, pulling into 
the driveway. (R. at 35-36). He exited his patrol car, now parked behind the pickup, 
and approached on the driver's side. 
3. Trooper Kendrick knocked on the driver's side window to try and make contact with 
the occupants, the Defendant and his significant other. (R. at 50). After a moment of 
no response, Trooper Kendrick opened the door to speak with the Defendant, the 
driver. (R. at 51). Trooper Kendrick immediately noticed the odor of alcohol and 
other signs of alcohol consumption on the Defendant. He also observed an open 
twelve pack of beer inside the pickup. (R. at 56). 
4. The Defendant was invited out of the pickup. The passenger also exited the pickup 
and began to confront Trooper Kendrick. Trooper Kendrick decided to call for 
backup. He instructed the Defendant to remain and he would be right back. (R. at 
60). After returning from calling for backup, Trooper Kendrick discovered that the 
Defendant had left the scene and gone inside the house. (R. at 63). 
5. Momentarily, backup arrived, and Trooper Kendrick again initiated contact with the 
Defendant by approaching the door to the living area of the residence inside the 
garage. By speaking through the doorway, Trooper Kendrick told the Defendant he 
could either come out of the house or he was going to come in to continue his 
investigation. The Defendant then came out of the house on his own accord. (R. at 
63-64). 
6. The Defendant consented to one field sobriety test. Afterwards, he refused any 
further tests. He was arrested and subsequently convicted of driving under the 
influence. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Trooper Kendrick proper.
 v 
and upon his own observations when he approached and subsequently arrested the defendant. 
The approach and detention of the Defendant were ;;;n.:; D.. , vi -i; aim .AJLI I-J ICUM JIMC 
suspicion that the defendant had violated traffic laws and was driving while under the 
influence. Further, Trooper Kendrick was justified in re-contacting the Defendant at his 
hoi i le In ordei to :• :M ifii n le his investigation. The defendant's conviction should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
First Issue: Whether Trooper Kendrick had reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant. 
1 he Defendant argues i- ,* •:•;•.- >• * .• ick lacked i easonable suspicioi 1 to detail 1 
him. The State agrees that the Defendant was detained, that a level two stop occurred; 
however, the State believes, and the record supports, that Trooper Kendrick had reasonable 
suspicion sufficient to detain the Defendant for investigation. 
"[Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has a 'reasonable suspicion based on 
(ihjPiin e hi'k ill fi ilit* iin\w>)tlif.il K im M|\ \ t\ in 1i iminal activity " In determining the 
existence of reasonable suspicion, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances." 
State v. Nguyen, S - - - v-^> : r :\J >r 
information relied upon must suggest to the officer, in that officer's experience, that 
( I .Ji : r . n ; i CI i _> v . v / i n u p V i i iMS 
added). 
With regard to \ chicle stops, the I Jtah Supreme Coi 11 i: has said: '[ \]s long as an 
officer suspects that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and 
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equipment regulations,' the police may legally stop the vehicle." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1132, (Utah 1994)(citations omitted). The investigating officer may rely upon his own 
observations and/or other sources of information to form reasonable suspicion for a stop. In 
cases where reasonable suspicion is primarily based upon a citizen informant's tip the stop is 
proper if the information is (1) reliable, (2) provides sufficient detail of criminal activity and 
(3) is confirmed by the investigating officer. See Kavsville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). A tip from an identified citizen informant is extremely reliable. City 
of St. George v. Carter, 325 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The information 
provided by the citizen informant should provide enough detail about criminal activity to 
support reasonable suspicion (e.g. illegal activity observed, description of vehicle, license 
number, and location of incident). Id To confirm a citizen informant's tip, the officer need 
not actually observe the reported behavior; it is sufficient, for example, that he verifies the 
suspect car's description and location within a reasonable time of the tip. Id 
In the present case, (1) Trooper Kendrick relied upon the eye witness report of a 
citizen informant, an extremely reliable source of information. The citizen appeared to be 
motivated out of community concern, going out of his way to stop and contact Trooper 
Kendrick while he was parked on the side of the highway. 
(2) The citizen provided detailed information regarding the incident. One, he 
described the Defendant's driving pattern, how the car was driving all over the roadway and 
had (either) struck (or) almost struck three vehicles. Two, he provided a description of the 
vehicle, including the type and make. Three, he provided the license plate number to the 
Defendant's vehicle. And, four, he indicated the approximate location and direction of travel 
of the vehicle. 
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(3) Trooper Kendrick also confirmed the citizen's information by locating the 
Defendar.i N w i n . . ; • ;: . • » * * - -1.4 
into the Defendant's driveway. 
Tii.• information supports a reasonable i-a.-,. L . ;H. . •» - ,- 1 
committed or was in the process of committing a traffic offense (e.g., improper lane travel, 
reckless driving or driving vv liile under the influence). Iherefore, 11ooper Kendrick had 
sufficient fri; t . wherein he could conclude, and articulate, reasonable suspicion in order to 
stop and/or detain the Defendant for further investigation. The Defendant was properly 
appi oached and detaine d 1: 3 1 1 oopei Kendi ick 
Second Issue: Whether Trooper Kendi • J i: :e* .-,• 
to make contact with the Defendant. 
The Defendant also argues that Trooper Kendrick performed an illegal search by 
opening (IK: d ine i " MI k 11 nil nl mini Defendnni' > [in kup hrs i imabl} , this \ \ 01 ild mean that 
the Defendant's arrest was improper as it flowed from the fruit of the poisonous tree. The 
SLile iclules Iliis.t• j.1 • 111 n.'i• 1 nn i\s m jnoiind1 I "" 1 n'tc1 M id, 'm^ nhjt I mopei K.eii(lri(i \ 
actions were part of a legitimate investigative detention and need only be supported by 
reasonable suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 I J S 1, 22-23 (1968)(polic e office 1 n iai,;; , ( • hen 
supported by reasonable suspicion, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible 
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest); United States v. 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 , 227 (1985)(if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in 
specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was or is 11lvolved in criminal 
acti\ it> then a "I erry stop 1 naj be 1 iiacie to in v estigate that suspicion). As discussed above, 
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Trooper Kendrick 
had sufficient facts wherein he could conclude, and articulate, reasonable suspicion in order 
to approach and/or detain the Defendant for further investigation. With this, he approached 
the Defendant's pickup, knocked on the window, waited, received no response, and then 
opened the door with the sole purpose to contact the Defendant to investigate the citizen 
informant's complaint. (R. at 50, lines 18 through 25.) Trooper Kendrick's actions, 
therefore, were justified and should be upheld as part of a legitimate investigative detention. 
Second, even if this Court finds that Trooper Kendrick's actions were a search and 
not part of a legitimate investigative detention, this Court should still uphold the Defendant's 
arrest and conviction, as any evidence that was obtained as a result of Trooper Kendrick 
opening the door would have been ultimately or inevitably discovered by lawful means. See 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of 
evidence if the information ultimately and inevitably would have been discovered by lawful 
means). As aforementioned, Trooper Kendrick had reasonable suspicion to detain the 
Defendant for investigation. His intent was to speak with the Defendant about the complaint. 
Inevitably, Trooper Kendrick would have made personal contact with the Defendant and 
detected the odor of alcoholic beverage coming from his person and observed the other signs 
of alcohol consumption on the Defendant. The Defendant was at his residence and preparing 
to get out of the truck to enter the home — presumably, the Defendant was not going to spend 
the night in the pickup and would have exited shortly. When the Defendant exited the 
pickup, Trooper Kendrick would be there to make the same observations as when he opened 
the door. 
Under either of these grounds the State believes Trooper Kendrick's actions did not 
7 
taint the Defendant's arrest and believes this Court should uphold the same. 
Third Issue: Whether I roopei Kendi ick proper 1} i e cent itacte> :ll! till: le Defei idant at his h :»! i le 
The Defendant next asserts that Trooper Kendrick conducted an unreasonable 
warrantless search or seizure of the defendant;.. . M.UI;:. ., -: \rticie i, .sc^rn ..., i iai 
State Constitution when he re-contacted the defendant at his home. Presumably, this would 
mean that the Defendant's arrest was improper as it flowed from the fruit of the poisonous 
t r e e Mir I 11 'i' 111 111 \y i'n '*< i li 111»ii M i11'l Hi i il M I I ' I I ii i • m u ' 11 is i u 11 
Firstly, there never was an entry into the home; the officers merely approached the 
home's LMitiaiiu' .il l l iegdm^L *11111 ^ M L lu lIn: Detniiliiiif (In ii I llii dmir ' ii.'iiilril flu 
Defendant was told by Trooper Kendrick that he would enter the home if the Defendant did 
not come out but, as the situation iic-ntrv.- -.=ut, neithe i I i oopei Kendi i ::k noi an> other officei 
entered the home. The Defendant came out on his own accord and subjected himself to 
further investigation by Trooper Kendrick. Therefore, there was not a warrantless entry into 
the Defendant's home and the Defendant's arrest was proper. 
Secondly, even if this Court finds that Trooper Kendrick entered the Defendant's 
h "*•' jzarajjy > ' . •..' ••= • .iu:.: rh's Court should still 
uphold the Defendant's arrest. The actions of the officer were fully justified. Trooper 
"[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude 
justified." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968). The 
defendant disobeyed the officer's order to remain thereby creating the need foi the officei to 
re-contact him. A suspect cannot openly thumb his nose at an investigating officer by 
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disobeying his order, entering his home and then feigning constitutional protections. To 
uphold such logic would frustrate legitimate law enforcement investigations and encourage 
dangerous conduct by detainees. See, e.g., U.C.A. § 44-6-13.5("Failure to respond to 
officer's signal to stop") and U.C.A. § 76-8-305 ("Interference with arresting officer"). 
Thirdly, the officer's entry was justified under the "exigent circumstances" exception 
to the warrant requirement. An officer may enter a home without a warrant when he has 
probable cause and an exigent circumstance exists. See State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 15-16 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). In the present case, Trooper Kendrick had probable cause to believe 
that the Defendant had committed the offense of driving while under the influence. (1) He 
had received reliable information from a citizen informant of the Defendant's driving pattern 
~ swerving on the roadway and nearly striking three vehicles — and confirmed that indeed 
the Defendant was driving the pickup. (2) In the Defendant's pickup, he observed an open 
twelve pack of beer. (3) He also observed the strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming 
from the pickup and the Defendant's person. (4) He noticed that the Defendant's speech was 
slurred, face flaccid and ptosis of the eyes. (R. at 56-57). (5) The Defendant was somewhat 
clumsy and dropped his wallet and other papers. (R. at 57). (6) The Defendant admitted to 
drinking alcohol. (R. at 59). (7) The Defendant attempted to avoid any further questioning 
or investigation by Trooper Kendrick. (R. at 60-65). And, (8) the Defendant appeared 
unstable on his feet. (R. at 61). 
Further, in the present case, an exigent circumstance existed. "Exigent circumstances 
are those 'that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry...was necessary to 
prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, 
the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law 
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enforcement efforts.'" Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18. 
This case satisfies several of the factual scenario of exigent circumstances proposed 
by Beavers. 1) Preservation of Evidence: Alcohol dissipates from the body over time; it is 
crucial to perform relevant tests shortly after the stop. 2) Escape of Suspect: The defendant 
left the scene after being told by the officer to "stay put." 3) Frustration of Law Enforcement 
Efforts: The defendant's departure from the scene after being ordered to stay violates U.C.A 
§ 76-8-305, ("Interference with an arresting officer"). 
Therefore, because Trooper Kendrick entered the home under the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, the Defendant's arrest was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
Officer Kendrick properly acted on information he received by a citizen informant 
and upon his own observations when he approached and subsequently arrested the defendant. 
The approach and detention of the Defendant were firmly based on articulable reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant had violated traffic laws and was driving while under the 
influence. Further, Trooper Kendrick was justified in re-contacting the Defendant at his 
home in order to continue his investigation. The defendant's conviction should be upheld. 
DATED this _*>_ day of June, 1998. 
Tony C. Baird 
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ADDENDUM " A " 
UT ST § 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcoh 
alcohol concentration-Measurement of blood or brea 
without warrant-Penalties-Suspension or revocation 
Utah Code § 41-6-44 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE 
INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS 
DRIVING 
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and 
2nd Sp. Sess. 
§ 41-6-44. Driving under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe 
blood alcohol concentration—Measurement 
of blood or breath alcohol—Criminal 
punishment—Arrest without warrant-
Penalties—Suspension or revocation of 
license 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for 
a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under 
Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or 
alcohol-related reckless driving adopted in 
compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 
76-5-207; or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other 
state, the United States, or any district, 
possession, or territory of the United States which 
would constitute a violation of this section or 
alcohol-related reckless driving if committed in 
this state, including punishments administered 
under 10 U.S.C. 815; 
(b) a violation of this section includes a 
violation under a local ordinance similar to this 
Copyright (c) West Group 1997 r 
I, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood Page 1 
alcohol-Criminal punishment-Arrest 
f license 
section adopted in compliance with Section 
41-6-43; and 
(c) the standard of negligence is that of simple 
negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of 
care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar 
circumstances. 
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if 
the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration 
of.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical 
test given within two hours after the alleged 
operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
or the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable 
of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating 
this section is or has been legally entitled to use 
alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of 
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 
liters of breath. 
*11516 (3) A person convicted the first or 
second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is 
guilty of a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor; or 
(b) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another 
as a proximate result of having operated the 
vehicle in a negligent manner; or 
(ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the 
vehicle at the time of the offense. 
> claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
UT ST § 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood 
alcohol concentration-Measurement of blood or breath alcohol-Criminal punishment-Arrest 
without warrant-Penalties-Suspension or revocation of license 
Page 2 
(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the court 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive 
hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part 
of a jail sentence, require the person to work in a 
community-service work program for not less 
than 24 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or 
community-service work program, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, 
as appropriate; and 
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, 
the court may order the person to obtain treatment 
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility determines that the person 
has a problem condition involving alcohol or 
drugs. 
(5)(a) If a person is convicted under Subsection 
(2) within six years of a prior conviction under 
this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 
240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part 
of a jail sentence, require the person to work in a 
community-service work program for not less 
than 80 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or 
community-service work program, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, 
as appropriate; and 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain 
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility. 
(6)(a) A third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of two or 
more prior convictions under this section is a: 
(i) class A misdemeanor except as provided in 
Subsection (ii); and 
(ii) third degree felony if at least: 
(A) three prior convictions are for violations 
committed after April 23, 1990; or 
*11517 (B) two prior convictions are for 
violations committed after July 1, 1996. 
(b)(i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as 
part of any sentence impose a fine of not less than 
$2,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of 
not less than 720 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to all or part 
of a jail sentence, require the person to work in a 
community-service work program for not less 
than 240 hours, but only if the court enters in 
writing on the record the reason it finds the 
defendant should not serve the jail sentence. 
Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved 
by the court may be a sentencing alternative to 
incarceration or community service if the program 
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and 
long-term closely supervised follow-through after 
the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or 
community-service work program, the court shall 
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol 
or drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(c) Under Subsection (a)(ii) if the court suspends 
the execution of a prison sentence and places the 
defendant on probation the court shall impose: 
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $800. (i) a fine of not less than $1,500; 
Copyright (c) West Group 1997 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
UT ST § 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood 
alcohol concentration-Measurement of blood or breath alcohol-Criminal punishment-Arrest 
without warrant-Penalties-Suspension or revocation of license 
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(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 
1,000 hours; and 
(iii) an order requiring the person to obtain 
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation program providing intensive care or 
inpatient treatment and long-term closely 
supervised follow-through after treatment. 
(7)(a) The mandatory portion of any sentence 
required under this section may not be suspended 
and the convicted person is not eligible for parole 
or probation until any sentence imposed under 
this section has been served. Probation or parole 
resulting from a conviction for a violation under 
this section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license 
suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction 
under this section, until the convicted person has 
furnished evidence satisfactory to the department 
that: 
or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, 
mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility; or do a 
combination of those things, apply to a conviction 
for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order 
regarding education or treatment at an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, 
in connection with a first, second, or subsequent 
conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9), as the court would render in 
connection with applying respectively, the first, 
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of 
Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) Any alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation program and any community-based 
or other education program provided for in this 
section shall be approved by the Department of 
Human Services. 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency 
assessment, education, treatment, and 
rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed 
after July 1, 1993, have been completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for 
restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed 
against the person have been paid, if the 
conviction is a second or subsequent conviction 
for a violation committed within six years of a 
prior violation; and 
*11518 (iii) the person does not use drugs in any 
abusive or illegal manner as certified by a 
licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility, if the conviction is for a 
third or subsequent conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of two prior violations 
committed after July 1, 1993. 
(8)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), 
and (6) that require a sentencing court to order a 
convicted person to: participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in 
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol 
(9)(a)(i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea 
of guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of 
Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction 
of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a 
violation of this section, the prosecution shall 
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, 
including whether or not there had been 
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 
of both, by the defendant in connection with the 
violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts 
that shows whether there was consumption of 
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before 
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of 
the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-44.6 or of 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each 
conviction of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 
entered under this subsection. 
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(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, 
arrest a person for a violation of this section when 
the officer has probable cause to believe the 
violation has occurred, although not in his 
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the 
person. 
*11519 (1 l)(a) The Department of Public Safety 
shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a 
person convicted for the first time under 
Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person 
convicted of any subsequent offense under 
Subsection (2) if the violation is committed 
within a period of six years from the date of the 
prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as 
ordered by the court under Subsection (12). 
(b) The department shall subtract from any 
suspension or revocation period the number of 
days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3-223, if the previous 
suspension was based on the same occurrence 
upon which the record of conviction is based. 
(12)(a) In addition to any other penalties 
provided in this section, a court may order the 
operator's license of a person who is convicted of 
a violation of Subsection (2) to be suspended or 
revoked for an additional period of 90 days, 180 
days, or one year to remove from the highways 
those persons who have shown they are safety 
hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's 
license under this subsection, the court shall 
prepare and send to the Driver License Division 
of the Department of Public Safety an order to 
suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges 
for a specified period of time. 
Amended by Laws 1994, c. 159; Laws 1994, c. 263; Laws 
1996, c. 71, § 1, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 220, § 1, 
eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 223, § 2, eff. July 1, 1996; 
Laws 1997, c. 68, § 1, eff May 5, 1997. 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Section 3 of Laws 1996, c. 220, provides: 
"If this bill and S.B. 4 [Laws 1996, c. 71], DUI 
Amendments, both pass, it is the intent of the Legislature 
that the amendments in Subsection 41-6-44(6) in this bill 
supersede the amendments to Subsections 41-6-44(6) and (7) 
in S.B. 4." 
Section 5(1) of Laws 1996, c. 223, provides: 
"If this bill and H.B. 3 [Laws 1996, c. 220], Driving Under 
the Influence Penalty Enhancement, both pass, it is the intent 
of the Legislature that the amendments to Subsection 
41-6-44(6) in H.B. 3 supersede the amendments to 
Subsection 41-6-44(6)(a), (6)(b), and (7) in this bill." 
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